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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Monetary policy may be a “science,” but it is hardly an exact one. Given that policy 
decisions are surrounded by uncertainty, the way central banks exploit information and agree 
on decisions clearly matters for the quality and success of monetary policy. As a result, 
recent research has emphasized the importance of central bank organization—and in 
particular the size and structure of central bank boards or monetary policy committees 
(MPCs)—for monetary policy.
1,2 
The question of how many people should decide on monetary policy has recently also 
stirred interest on practical grounds. In Europe, the possible increase in euro area 
membership has triggered an intense debate on the optimal design of the decision-making 
process in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) 19-member Governing Council, in which 
there is at least one representative from each member country (see, for instance, Baldwin, 
Berglöf, Giavazzi, and Widgren, 2001; Berger, de Haan, and Inklaar, 2004). As an outcome 
of this discussion, the ECB has generally limited the (future) number of voting members 
to 21. Even with this restriction, however, the Council appears to be relatively large 
compared with, for instance, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee 
(9 members) or the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (12). Of the 
                                                 
1 To avoid confusion, we will hereinafter generally use the terms MPC or central bank board, instead of the 
various specific national terms describing the board, committee, council, or body in charge of deciding whether 
to change the monetary policy stance to achieve a specified target. 
2 Other features of central bank design that may have the potential to affect the quality of monetary policy 
decision-making include the meeting procedures (consensus decisions, voting arrangements, etc. ), whether the 
members are full-time employees with the central bank or part-time external members, and if there are 
government representative(s), if any, with voting rights or the ability to temporarily postpone decisions. These 
factors, although important, are outside the scope of this paper.   - 2 - 
 
82 central banks surveyed by Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger, and Sterne (2000), 
55 institutions (~67 percent) had policy committees with 5–10 members. 
In this paper, we aim to characterize differences in the membership size of decision-
making bodies of central banks around the world. Since central banks often operate various 
boards, committees, and councils, we focus on the central bank’s implementation board (or 
MPC) that makes decisions on whether and when to change policy instruments to achieve a 
given monetary policy target. Lybek and Morris (2004) provide a more detailed discussion of 
the various functions of central bank boards. 
In principle, the optimal size of an MPC depends on the costs and benefits of 
membership size.
3 The benefits from having more people on a board are mainly related to 
improvements in information processing. A larger number of board members should involve 
a broader range of experiences and perspectives and, hence, (ideally) be better in dealing 
with uncertainty—an argument that is loosely based on Condorcet’s jury theorem. At the 
same time, decision making tends to become more difficult as board size increases. As 
membership size grows, different views are typically harder to reconcile, and discussions at 
board meetings often become more time consuming. As a result, decisions might be delayed 
or require more effort, thereby weakening the effectiveness of monetary policy.  
                                                 
3 Our framework is related to the recent discussion on the size of boards of corporations. Reviewing the 
literature, Hermalin and Weisbach (2001, p. 31) note that: “Board composition [share of outside versus inside 
directors] is not related to corporate performance, while board size is negatively related to corporate 
performance. Both board composition and size do appear to be related to the quality of the board’s decisions 
regarding CEO replacement, acquisitions, poison pills, and executive compensation.” However, in the case of 
commercial corporations, the primary objective (e.g., to maximize shareholder wealth) is often clearer than for 
central banks. Furthermore, central bank boards typically have a smaller role, or none at all, in the appointment 
of the governor and in compensation decisions than commercial boards have.    - 3 - 
 
The exact structure of the trade-off between costs and benefits determining optimal 
MPC size, however, depends on country-specific characteristics. For instance, the argument 
to increase board size to achieve better information processing appears to be of particular 
relevance when an economy is large or characterized by considerable diversity across regions 
and industries. Similarly, a country’s political institutions may matter for optimal MPC size. 
Less democratic regimes, for instance, may have a preference for a smaller board, since a 
larger MPC could provide useful insulation from political pressures.
4,5 Finally, MPC size is 
probably also affected by other elements of central bank design such as the institutional 
functions performed by a central bank. If the central bank enjoys full autonomy over both 
policy targets and instruments, the MPC may be larger than when the central bank’s 
autonomy is more limited. In view of the considerable cross-country variation along 
economic, political, and institutional dimensions, Goodfriend (2005, p. 85) argues that “the 
efficient size of a policy committee might vary across countries.”
6  
In the following sections, we analyze empirically whether country-specific features 
help to explain differences in MPC size. Our results indicate that board size is indeed 
strongly and plausibly associated with a number of country-specific characteristics. We find, 
                                                 
4 One argument could be that large board size combined with anonymous majority voting would allow 
individual board members to claim to have been outvoted or otherwise dominated in the decision-making 
process. 
5 Related to size, it may in practice also make a difference if some of the MPC members are full-time 
employees of the central bank (i.e., “internal members”) whose future careers may depend on the chairman of 
the MPC, typically the governor, or the members are “external” members. In the case of the former, the meeting 
dynamics may also be influenced by Keynes’s “beauty contest factor,” where these members may also be 
tempted to refine their own interventions in line with those they expect the chairman will favor. The special role 
of the chairman (see, for instance, Chappell, McGregor, and Vermilyea 2004) and the issue of internal and 
external members (see, for example, Tuladhar 2005, who provides such information on MPCs in inflation– 
targeting countries) are indeed important, but lie outside the scope of this paper.   - 4 - 
 
for instance, that board size is positively related to country size, thereby providing strong 
support for the theoretical and experimental observation that a central bank’s information-
processing requirements affect board size. We also find that MPC size is related to a 
country’s political institutions, with more democratic countries having, on average, larger 
boards. Finally, MPC size is often associated with other central bank characteristics. Central 
banks that have a more complex monetary strategy, a longer history, and more staff typically 
have more board members who serve, on average, shorter terms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a 
detailed discussion of possible determinants of MPC size. Section III presents the data and 
the empirical results, and Section IV provides a brief conclusion. 
 
II.   POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF CENTRAL BANK BOARD SIZE 
The size of the central bank board, or the MPC, is an important feature of central 
bank design. In practice, the decision on the number of board members appears to reflect 
various factors, including the political environment in which the decision on MPC size is 
made. In fact, one way to picture the decision process on board size is purely political. For 
instance, the number of central bank board members could be the result of a bargaining 
process that involves different interest groups (e.g., the financial sector, trade unions, or 
export industries) aiming at direct or indirect representation in the MPC.
7 Alternatively, the 
decision on MPC size could take the form of a conscious design decision of a decision-maker 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 Sibert (2006, p. 1) notes, in similar fashion, that, “[a]s a result of shirking and coordination problems, smaller 
committees may be better than larger ones and the optimal size for a committee is an empirical issue.”   - 5 - 
 
based on social or private preferences and subject to more or less binding political 
constraints.
8 Following the more recent literature, however, we will organize our discussion 
of the determinants of central bank board size around the trade-off of (some of the more 
obvious) costs and benefits of an increasing number of board members.
9 
 
A.   The Basic Trade-Off 
On the benefit side, the most prominent argument in favor of increasing the number 
of MPC members is that larger MPCs could be in a better position to process, analyze, and 
interpret economic information—ultimately leading to better monetary policy decisions—
than individuals relying mostly on their own information and judgment. Working in a 
notoriously uncertain macroeconomic environment, multiple MPC members are able to pool 
information and exploit divisions of labor in information processing.
10 The argument has 
been formalized, among others, by Gerlach-Kristen (2006) and Berk and Bierut (2004); 
supportive experimental evidence is produced by Blinder and Morgan (2005) and 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 A case in point are the recent amendments to the central bank law of Hungary in 2004, where the balance in 
the monetary policy committee was changed by increasing the number of members. 
8 Provided the central bank independence paradigm is acknowledged, the design-scenario may be more relevant 
for boards that primarily make decisions on whether to change monetary policy instruments to achieve a 
specified target (instrument autonomy) than for policy boards that are also involved in determining the target of 
the central bank (target autonomy) or even deciding on its primary objective (goal autonomy), which is much 
more normative. 
9 See, among others, Goodfriend (2005), Berger (2006), and Sibert (2006). It should be noted that the forces 
shaping any political process relevant for the decision on MPC size may be somewhat similar in nature to the 
forces considered in a cost-benefit approach. 
10 MPC members may contribute by their differences in various ways, namely by the: (i) underlying model, 
meaning the underlying paradigms in which they believe; (ii) their experiences, meaning how they “estimate” 
the parameters in their model; (iii) the information set they use as input in their model; and not least (iv) 
different objective functions, which explicitly or implicitly may differ from the primary objective of the MPC.    - 6 - 
 
Lombardelli, Proudman, and Talbot (2005).
11 Gerling, Grüner, Kiel, and Schulte (2005) and 
Fujiki (2005) provide comprehensive surveys of the literature; Sibert (2006) and 
Vandenbussche (2006) review the related—and highly useful—social psychology literature 
that looks at the effects of group size on information processing and moderation.
12 
On the cost side, a plausible conjecture is that larger MPCs will generally imply 
greater effort from all involved for a given decision problem which may translate into less 
effective monetary policy making. The most important aspect is communication among 
members (and the resulting dynamics of the discussion). For instance, it seems obvious that 
even if the exchange of ideas at the preparatory stage of a decision is limited to a solitary 
statement by MPC members addressing their colleagues, larger MPCs would require more 
time than smaller MPCs in reaching a decision. Moreover, actual decision-making costs are 
likely to have a non-linear component. If MPC members regularly “sound each other out” 
during meetings (see, for instance, Barber 2001), the time requirement for preparing a 
decision will rise exponentially in the number of members (Berger 2006).
13 Moreover, 
individual representation at the board becomes less important as the number of decision 
                                                 
11 Already Blinder (1998) noted that in a committee decisions tend to regress toward the mean, making it very 
difficult for idiosyncratic (or extreme) views to prevail. More recent contributions pointing in the same direction 
include Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2006). Méon (2006, p. 1), for instance, shows that: “The volatility of the 
policy is smaller the smaller the volatility of members’ preferences, smaller the larger the size of the committee, 
and smaller than if it was chosen by a single member.” Sibert (2006), however, argues that decision-making by 
committee may not necessarily result in moderation. 
12 Schein (1999) is a related contribution from the business literature that looks at group-based decision 
making. 
13 If there are n MPC members, the number of bilateral discussions is ½ (n
2-n). The need for preparatory 
communication will be especially pronounced in central bank environments given to consensus-based decision 
making. This includes roughly half of the more than 80 central banks surveyed by Fry et al. (2000).   - 7 - 
 
makers increases so that the gains from diversity of skills and perspectives of members 
become smaller for larger central bank boards.
14 
The view that increasing MPC membership size may reduce the effectiveness of 
policy-making is also bolstered by real-world experience. The German Bundesbank, for 
instance, asserts that its 1992 MPC reform triggered by German unification helped to prevent 
an increase in MPC size which “would have greatly complicated that body’s decision-making 
processes” (Deutsche Bundesbank 1992, p. 50). More recently, the ECB (2003, p. 83) has 
expressed the fear that the anticipated increase in the number of national central bank 
governors attending euro area MPC meetings after EMU enlargement “will not necessarily 
make deliberations easier”. 
The trade-off between costs and benefits determining optimal MPC size is influenced 
by a number of country characteristics. As Goodfriend (2005) argues, larger and more 
heterogeneous currency areas may benefit particularly from larger MPCs. This could be 
because of increased monitoring necessities or because a higher level of economic 
development gives rise to more complex monetary strategies, which may require larger 
decision-making bodies. Moreover, “[i]f an economy is complex, even if not particularly 
large geographically, then it might be useful to have the views of the key sectors represented 
on the policy committee” (p.85). At the same time, the costs of larger MPCs are also likely to 
vary with the size of the economy. For instance, the size of MPCs is less relevant for (the 
costs of) decision-making in cases where the central bank runs monetary policy for a small, 
                                                 
14 Blinder and Morgan (2005) argue that small but not-too-large-groups of individuals may reach “better” 
decisions at speeds broadly comparable to an individual. As groups increase, however, individual members may 
have a stronger incentive to “freeride” on the information processing efforts of others, especially if information 
processing is a costly activity, which will lead to growing inefficiencies (e.g., Sibert 2006).    - 8 - 
 
open, and highly integrated economy so that there is a priori little room for independent 
policy-making in the first place. Similarly, decision-making costs may vary with the 
underlying cultural consensus or democratic structure, which, in turn, could be a function of 
country size or heterogeneity.
15  
 
B.   Determinants of Monetary Policy Committee Size 
In what follows, we present a number of relevant and empirically testable hypotheses 
along this line, aiming to make the argument for an association between MPC size and 
country characteristics operational. 
 
Country size and heterogeneity 
As a starting point, it seems safe to assume that a central bank’s requirements for 
information processing are a (positive) function of (within-)country diversity and country 
size. For instance, for economies with complex structures, a large number of central bank 
board members might be particularly useful, allowing a review in detail of the (often diverse) 
information from various sectors and regions. Also, it is often larger currency areas that host 
a more heterogeneous population with diverging preferences and/or varying institutional and 
cultural backgrounds, possibly weighing on monetary policy.
16 For instance, if larger 
                                                 
15 For instance, costs could be influenced by the nature of the decision-making process, such as the prevalence 
of consensus-based traditions, majority voting, or leadership style of the MPC’s president. “Group think,” the 
risk that one or a few charismatic persons dominate and prevent valid critical questions be addressed, may be 
less problematic in larger boards. A more detailed discussion can be found in Berger (2006). 
16 Of course, there are also political-economic factors that could translate heterogeneity into larger MPC size. 
For instance, in the absence of proper democratic institutions, a more politically diverse population might 
require a larger MPC to represent all relevant interest groups, possibly including external members. We return 
to this issue below.   - 9 - 
 
countries tend to produce more federal political structures, these structures may more easily 
translate into the presence of regional representatives in the MPC.
17 Finally, larger countries 
may be more independent in their monetary policy, which may make having larger MPCs 
more worthwhile. In sum, we hypothesize that measures of country size such as land area or 
population are positively correlated with MPC size. Similarly, measures of a country’s 
cultural or political fragmentation may have a positive influence on the size of the MPC. 
 
Development and openness 
Another group of empirically identifiable factors that potentially affect MPC size are 
the economy’s state of economic development and its degree of external openness. One 
plausible conjecture that links central bank organization to the level of economic development 
is that the existence of a more elaborate monetary policy framework, including perhaps a 
larger MPC, may be a positive function of the average income level in a country. More 
specifically, larger and more developed economies could be less inclined to opt for simple 
monetary rules (such as a fixed exchange rate) and introduce more complex strategies (such 
as forward-looking inflation targeting), which may require larger MPCs to manage.
18 Also, 
countries at higher income levels and with more developed financial markets should have a 
larger supply of well-educated staff and (well-qualified) potential MPC members, thereby 
loosen any possible constraint imposed on MPC size at lower income levels. Furthermore, 
                                                 
17 On regional representation in MPCs, see, among others, Berger and de Haan (2002), Meade and Sheets 
(2005), and Berger (2006). 
18 Another link pointing in that direction is that more financial development means that more people depend on 
financial assets and hence are more vulnerable to inflation (Posen, 1995). As they demand more central bank 
autonomy and accountability, this could imply the establishment of larger central bank boards. In less 
(continued…)  -  10  - 
 
more developed and dynamic financial markets may result in more frequent changes in the 
monetary transmission mechanism which implies the need for more balanced information 
when adjusting the monetary policy instruments. 
On openness, Romer (1993) has argued that economies more open to international 
trade are more sensitive to currency fluctuations and this sensitivity should lead to a more 
disciplined economic policy overall. If openness is indeed making the MPC’s life easier, by 
imposing, for instance, greater discipline on fiscal policy, a fewer number of board numbers 
are needed in more open economies. The same should hold, other things equal, for 





A larger MPC may also have advantages for political economy reasons. As noted 
before, diversity in terms of language or culture may increase the attractiveness of a larger 
MPC which would allow fuller representation of varying interests and thereby increase the 
likelihood of gaining political legitimacy. Along similar lines, it could be argued that more 
developed democratic institutions allow for greater diversity in opinion and preferences and, 
therefore, may be a factor in favor of a more sizable MPC. 
                                                                                                                                                       
developed countries, which typically have a younger population, the preference toward price stability may be 
smaller. 
19 Empirically, a high degree of openness at period t may or may not be highly correlated with measures of 
business cycle correlation in the past. D’Amato and Martina (2005) argue on theoretical grounds that a high 
degree of business cycle correlation across countries should provide incentives to decrease central bank 
independence. If this was correct, and larger MPCs and central bank independence were substitutes (see below), 
this would lead us to expect a positive correlation between a correlation measure and MPC size.  -  11  - 
 
Another potentially relevant argument from a political economy perspective is related 
to the incentive of governments to dominate monetary policy for fiscal reasons. At the 
extreme, this may lead to fiscal determinacy of the price level, where monetary policy is 
forced to fully accommodate excessive fiscal behavior, including financing quasi-fiscal 
activities, and to allow runaway inflation to deflate the level of public debt (see, e.g., 
Woodford 2003). At a less drastic level, government officials may put pressure on the MPC 
to ease monetary policy and thereby lower the interest burden for the public finances. To 
insulate monetary policy from these pressures, optimal central bank design would aim for a 
high degree of central bank independence (see, e.g., Rogoff 1985), which may include 
establishing a large MPC (since larger boards may be less easily swayed by government 
influence).
20 As a consequence, we might observe a positive correlation between MPC size 
and measures of fiscal pressure. Similarly, under the assumption that such pressures are 




Other central bank characteristics 
Finally, if the membership size of the central bank board is part of a multidimensional 
design process of central bank organization, we may expect that other design choices are 
                                                 
20 Blinder (2006, p. 3) argues that, “[w]hen the central bank was just following orders communicated by the 
government, there was not much reason to have a committee on the other end of the phone. An individual 
governor sufficed–and also limited the phone bill.” 
21 Strictly speaking, the latter argument is an element of central bank design rather than the political 
environment (see following section). In practice, deficit financing is increasingly being alleviated by central 
bank legislation explicitly prohibiting direct or indirect central bank financing of the fiscal deficits and the 
financing of quasi-fiscal activities.   -  12  - 
 
reflected in MPC size as well. For instance, with reference to the discussion above, if central 
banks have greater autonomy (e.g., the authority to prioritize their objectives and specify the 
target to pursue generally), they are likely to have larger MPCs. More generally, central 
banks that are more independent from government are expected to operate under larger 
MPCs.  
In similar fashion, the monetary policy strategy and the exchange rate regime in 
which a central bank operates may be relevant determinants of MPC size. Decisions on 
changing interest rates require less deliberation and forward-looking analysis, and thus a 
smaller MPC, under a fixed exchange rate regime (where the central bank essentially follows 
the monetary policy of the anchor country) than monetary policy under floating exchange 
rates. 
In addition, one may argue that there is a negative association between MPC size and 
the (envisaged) average term length of MPC members since smaller groups require longer 
terms to ensure continuity.
22 Alternatively, larger groups are able to accommodate higher 
fluctuation frequencies without endangering the independence of the MPC from the 
government (which is likely to be involved in the nomination of new members).
23 
Another factor that might be associated with MPC size is the number of central bank 
staff. A possible link between the two variables is number of functions performed by the 
central bank, which may require both more staff and a larger MPC (e.g., if the MPC has also 
                                                 
22 Another possible link could be the so-called stabilization bias of monetary policy (e.g., Woodford 2003): if 
larger groups mean slower decision-making, larger MPCs could be a means to introduce optimal inertia into 
interest rate setting—albeit perhaps not an efficient one. See Mirzoev (2004) for an argument for lowering the 
meeting frequency of MPCs to achieve the same effect. 
23 A related literature discusses central bank appointments and staggered contracts; see, for instance, Waller 
(1989, 1992, 2002) and Waller and Walsh (1996).  -  13  - 
 
duties other than to decide on monetary policy).
24 The central bank’s operating expenditures 
may be another proxy for the functions performed by the central bank. Finally, path 
dependencies (possibly captured by the age of the institution) may play a role for MPC size, 
with younger institutions being plausibly characterized by (yet) smaller boards. 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In the following, we test the above predictions empirically. Our strategy is to examine 
the association between MPC size and country characteristics in a very general fashion. 
Instead of emphasizing a particular variable or estimation method, we use a (large) number 
of alternative measures and a variety of simple econometric specifications to identify 
possible structural correlations in the data. This approach also helps to take account of 
possible data limitations for individual variables. We begin this section by describing our 
data, and then turn to testing the relationships between MPC size and various country 
characteristics, including features of central bank design. 
 
A.   Data Description 
At the heart of our data set is the MPC size data obtained from Lybek and Morris 
(2004). This publication surveys 101 central bank laws (covering 113 countries) at the end of 
2003 and classifies the governance structure of central banks along various dimensions. 
Lybek and Morris (2004) distinguish between different types of central bank boards (policy 
                                                 
24 Alternatively, there could be specialized “boards” to deal with other functions. The Reserve Bank of 
Australia is a case in point having a special Payment System Board.   -  14  - 
 
boards, implementation boards, pure supervisory boards, and advisory bodies) depending on 
the type of autonomy. We use information on the most relevant and powerful central bank 
board, the “implementation board,” i.e., the body that decides whether to change monetary 
policy instruments to achieve a specified target. Since Lybek and Morris (2004) have 
grouped MPCs into size classes of three members, we use effectively a board size index that 
takes the value of one if the MPC consists of 1–3 members, the value of two if there are 4–6 
members, and so on.
25 Figure 1 provides a histogram of our MPC size measure. The 84 
countries included in our sample are listed in Appendix I.
26 
Our accompanying data on country characteristics and central bank features come 
from a number of different sources. Most of the data on country characteristics are taken 
from Rose (2006), who has compiled a large and comprehensive data set of country 
attributes, including physical, cultural, economic, political, geographic, and social 
phenomena. To this data set, we add information on various central bank features such as the 
term length of board members, the type of legal independence, the establishment year, staff 
size, and operational expenses of the central bank. This information is mainly obtained from 
Lybek and Morris (2004); other sources are the Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory, Fry 
et al. (2000), and Ize (2006). Finally, we have compiled macroeconomic data (e.g., on a 
country’s fiscal position) from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial  
                                                 
25 Lybek and Morris (2004) provide no information on the precise number of MPC members. It should be 
noted, however, that also some central bank laws stipulate no fixed number but give a range for the number of 
required board members. Another qualification of the Lybek and Morris data is that they focus on boards and 
committees and therefore provide no information on central banks where the governor alone is responsible for 
decisions on how to implement the policy. Thus, de facto our smallest size category for board membership 
covers boards with 2–3 members.  -  15  - 
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N = 84 / mean = 2.85 / std. dev. = 0.87 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
26 The main difference to the Lybek and Morris (2004) sample of 101 central bank laws is that we drop central 
banks that are involved in a multilateral currency union (since these central banks have either no responsibility 
for monetary policy or make decisions on monetary policy for a larger currency area).  -  16  - 
 
Statistics. We also use three different exchange rate regime classifications: the well-known 
de facto classifications from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), and the de jure classification from the IMF (2003). Detailed sources for variables are 
tabulated in Appendix II. Appendix III provides descriptive statistics.
27 
 
B.   Methodology 
We now turn to the correlates of central bank board size. We estimate both simple 
bivariate models and models augmented with a few key controls. In particular, we estimate 
regressions of the form: 
 
MPC = α + β x +  γ Y + ε 
 
where MPC is our ordered MPC (or board) size index, x is the variable of interest, Y is a set 
of control variables and ε is a well-behaved residual. Due to the discrete categorical nature of 
our dependent variable, we estimate our equation using ordered probit techniques. 
                                                 
27 Most explanatory variables are either time-invariant or contemporaneous to MPC size. The underlying 
hypothesis is that the size of MPCs (as any element of central bank design) is subject to constant re-evaluation, 
either through the relevant authorities or the underlying political process. If this is indeed the case, we expect 
our explanatory variables to show a significant impact on MPC size. The alternative hypothesis is that MPC size 
is determined in a “one shot” game or design decision and not subject to change. In this case, finding a 
significant relationship with current country characteristics would be less likely, at least if the determinants of 
MPC size change over time. In practice, however, with many of the explanatory variables showing considerable 
inertia themselves (and the recent wave of central bank reforms having changed MPC sizes in a number of 
countries including, for instance, the U.K. and Sweden), the distinction between both views is somewhat less 
sharp than what one might think. Ultimately, however, this is an empirical question.  -  17  - 
 
 
Table 1. Characterizing MPCs: Size 
 

















































Table 2. Characterizing MPCs: Heterogeneity 
 

































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
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C.   Bivariate Results 
Tables 1–5 present the benchmark estimation results. For each variable, we report 
three sets of estimates. The first column records the slope coefficients obtained from simple 
bivariate estimation.
28 In column 2, we report the results of an augmented regression, in 
which population and per capita income are added as control variables.
29 Finally, the last 
column presents the bivarate results with the MPC size measure transformed into a binary 
index that takes the value of one if the MPC comprises more than six members and zero 
otherwise; these results are based on standard probit estimates. In practice, it turns out that all 
of our key findings are robust to this transformation of board size into small and large boards; 
this also suggests that our results are not sensitive to outliers.
30 In the following, we group 
variables along the lines of arguments outlined in the previous section. 
Table 1 examines the linkage between (various indicators of) country size and MPC 
size. Most of the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that larger countries tend to have larger central bank boards. Reviewing the results in detail, 
the measure that is most closely related to Condorcet’s jury theorem is a country’s total 
population. The estimated coefficient on this variable is strongly positive (across all 
specifications) and statistically highly significant, indicating that more populous countries 
have more MPC members. For other useful proxies of country size, such as land area (as a 
                                                 
28 Appendix IV shows accompanying scatter plots (for most variables). 
29 We have also experimented with other sets of controls (e.g., central bank staff). The main findings were 
basically unaffected.  -  19  - 
 
measure of a country’s physical extension) or the gross domestic product (as a proxy for 
economic mass), the results are basically identical (which is not totally surprising given the 
generally strong positive correlation between these measures). 
There is also some evidence that heterogeneity is associated with larger central bank 
boards (Table 2). As argued in Section II, greater diversity provides good reason for the 
creation of larger MPCs. This reasoning, however, may be more relevant for policy boards 
than for more technical boards such as MPCs that determine whether to change interest rates 
to achieve a specified target. To explore this issue empirically, we examine a broad range of 
variables on population heterogeneity, including various measures of ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious diversity, indicators of the spread in income distribution and geographic location, 
and a country’s political fragmentation as measured by the number of its first-order 
administrative divisions. While most of the coefficients on these variables take a positive 
sign, only the point estimate on the ethnolinguistic fractionalization measure, a variable that 
is available for only a small share of the sample, is statistically different from zero. The 
number of a country’s administrative units is also slightly (positively) correlated with central 
bank board size. 
In comparison, there is only weak evidence that measures of a country’s level of 
economic development or the degree of external openness influence MPC size; results are 
reported in Table 3. Reviewing the coefficients, there is only one relationship of reasonable 
statistical strength: landlocked countries have smaller boards. Broadly in line with this 
finding, we find that trade openness is consistently negatively associated with MPC size, 
                                                                                                                                                       
30 As another test for possible non-linearities, we re-estimated all equations with squared values of the variables 
of interest entered; see below.  -  20  - 
 
although the coefficient is not statistically different from zero in any of the specifications. In 
contrast, most variables typically associated with economic and financial development and 
material well-being neither show the expected sign nor are they statistically significant. 
The empirical results for indicators of a country’s political regime, tabulated in 
Table 4, seem to suggest that well-established democratic institutions and countries with 
stronger governance performance are associated with larger central bank boards. In terms of 
statistical significance, however, results appear to be somewhat mixed. In the simple 
bivariate specification, none of the coefficients on measures of institutional quality is 
statistically different from zero. Still, for some variables, the estimated coefficients at least 
border conventional levels of significance, an impression that is also observable from the 
scatter plots (shown in the Appendix). Moreover, when we control for size and income, the 
estimated coefficients increase in magnitude and become statistically highly significant. 
At a more detailed level, it turns out that the standard Polity IV scores (democracy, 
autocracy, polity), which comprise composite measures of institutionalized characteristics of 
the political regime, are weakly but consistently linked with MPC size across specifications. 
Countries with open and democratic political institutions tend to have large MPCs, while 
countries with autocratic structures have relatively small MPCs, though none of the nine 
coefficients is statistically different from zero. The estimates for the Freedom House measure 
on the state of civil liberties (political rights, civil rights) are not only supportive to this 
hypothesized relationship but also somewhat stronger statistically; the results indicate that 
“free” countries (as measured by low scores) have on average more members on their central 
bank boards than countries with a low freedom ranking. Finally, we experiment with several 
indicators on various dimensions of democracy, governance, and anti-corruption (voice and -  21  - 
 
 
Table 3. Characterizing MPCs: Level of Development and Openness 
 































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
  -  22  - 
 
 
Table 4. Characterizing MPCs: Political Regime 
 





























































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
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 accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law)––measures that were compiled by the World Bank. The 
results seem to support the idea that a better quality of governance is accompanied by larger 
MPCs. Most notably, the voice and accountability measure, which is an indicator of the 
extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of their 
government, is significantly positively related to MPC size in the augmented model.
31  
In a final iteration, we find that larger government debt (in percent of GDP) is often 
associated with larger MPCs. However, the estimate is drawn from a relatively limited 
sample of countries, and no such relation can be found for the fiscal deficit. 
Table 5 examines the association between the size of MPCs and other central bank 
features. We begin with several (binary) measures of central bank independence, taken from 
Lybek and Morris (2004) and a recent Bank of England survey among central banks (Fry et 
al., 2000). Overall, the evidence is mixed. Most of the legal measures obtained from Lybek 
and Morris, classifying different types of legal autonomy of a central bank, are uncorrelated 
with the number of board members.
32 Some results based on Fry et al.’s (2000) independence 
scores, in contrast, indicate that more independent central banks have relatively larger 
boards, thereby providing mild support for Blinder (2006); these results, however, are 
derived from a smaller sample.
33 Moreover, there is a positive correlation between the extent 
                                                 
31 The indicator summarizes a number of aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights. 
32 Note that different types of autonomy (goal autonomy, target autonomy, instrument autonomy, and limited or 
no autonomy) refers to the type of decisions the central bank determines, but that the quality of independence 
depends on a range of other factors discussed in, for instance, Lybek (1998, 1999). 
33 We also tried a number of alternative measures of central bank independence that are frequently used in the 
literature, without much success. For most of these measures, sample size gets extremely small when member 
countries of the euro area (which are not covered in our analysis) are removed.  -  24  - 
 
Table 5. Characterizing MPCs: Central Bank Characteristics 
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Table 5 (concluded). Characterizing MPCs: Central Bank Characteristics 
 


















Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
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to which there are limits on central bank financing of government deficits and MPC size (in 
the augmented specification). 
A country’s exchange rate regime appears to be a useful proxy for the complexity of 
the central bank’s monetary policy strategy. Based on the most commonly used de jure and 
de facto exchange rate regime classifications, we have compiled binary measures for both 
hard-fixed and fully free-floating exchange rates (leaving the various intermediate forms of 
exchange rate pegs and inconclusive regimes as a control group). While the coefficients on 
the dummy variables for a fixed exchange rate regime (which are expected to be negative) 
are rarely significant in our regressions, the estimated coefficients on the floating exchange 
rate dummies often take on a significantly positive sign, implying that countries with flexible 
exchange rates tend to have larger boards. 
Concerning the term length of board members, we explore two features: the (de jure) 
term length in years, and whether the term length is stipulated in the central bank law. 
Neither coefficient is statistically different from zero.
34 
Finally, we find a significant (positive) correlation between the size of a central bank 
and the size of the central bank board. Central banks with more staff and higher operating 
expenditures (and, thus, possibly more functions) also operate larger MPCs, while recently 
established central banks tend to have smaller boards, although only the former relations are 
significant at conventional statistical levels. 
                                                 
34 Our measure of term length for MPC members is obtained from Lybek and Morris (2004); the measure is 
highly positively correlated with equivalent information for central bank governors that is reported in the 
Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory.  -  27  - 
 
Table 6. Quadratic Results 
Variable  Coefficient 1  Std. dev.  Coefficient 2  Std. dev. 
Population   0.018**  (0.007)  -0.00004#  (0.00002) 
Area    0.172 (0.139)    0.005 (0.012) 
Real GDP (USD)   0.459  (0.362)  -0.033  (0.035) 
Real GDP (PPP)   0.850#  (0.443)  -0.069  (0.042) 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  -0.218 (2.228)    1.538 (2.566) 
Ethnic Fractionalization, CH  -0.010 (0.021)    0.0002  (0.0002) 
Ethnic Fractionalization, ADEKW  -0.666 (2.733)    1.036 (3.197) 
Linguistic Diversity  -4.954 (1.605)    0.818 (1.772) 
Linguistic Fractionalization  -1.484 (1.609)    1.712 (1.876) 
Religious Fractionalization  -2.340 (2.030)    3.652 (2.364) 
Gini Coefficient   0.031  (0.071)  -0.0004  (0.0008) 
Geographic Dispersion   0.311  (3.785)  -0.205  (3.494) 
Administrative Divisions   0.024*  (0.011)  -0.0001*  (0.00005) 
Real GDP per capita (USD)   0.030  (0.038)  -0.001  (0.002) 
Real GDP per capita (PPP)   0.043  (0.042)  -0.001  (0.002) 
Human Development Index   1.027  (7.154)  -0.411  (5.479) 
Urbanization   0.026  (0.020)  -0.0002  (0.0002) 
M3   0.005  (0.010)  -0.00003  (0.00005) 
Domestic Bank Credit  -0.005 (0.006)    0.00002  (0.00002) 
Trade Openness  -0.016# (0.008)   0.00005  (0.00003) 
Business Cycle Correlation   0.526  (0.416)  -0.931  (1.322) 
Democracy   0.083  (0.136)  -0.003  (0.014) 
Autocracy  -0.155 (0.130)    0.011 (0.016) 
Polity   0.033  (0.024)  -0.00009  (0.0041) 
Political Rights   0.096  (0.287)  -0.023  (0.038) 
Civil Rights   0.553  (0.411)  -0.086  (0.054) 
Economic Freedom   0.427  (1.969)  -0.040  (0.150) 
Economic Security   4.039*  (2.004)  -3.713#  (2.029) 
Voice & Accountability   0.196  (0.154)  -0.255  (0.165) 
Political Stability   0.014  (0.140)  -0.185  (0.127) 
Government Effectiveness   0.330*  (0.140)  -0.307*  (0.128) 
Regulatory Quality   0.138  (0.173)  -0.252#  (0.136) 
Rule of Law   0.399**  (0.145)  -0.408**  (0.146) 
Deficit  -0.017 (0.024)    0.004 (0.004) 
Debt   0.029**  (0.011)  -0.0002*  (0.00007) 
Central Bank Independence   1.251  (0.650)  -0.233  (0.126) 
CB Independence Score   0.072  (0.045)  -0.0004  (0.0003) 
Price Stability Focus   1.272  (2.055)  -0.579  (1.760) 
Target Independence Score   3.192*  (1.242)  -3.087*  (1.275) 
Instrument Independence Score   2.212  (1.861)  -0.786  (1.646) 
Lim. CB Financing of Gov’t Deficit   7.912#  (4.505)  -5.437#  (3.177) 
Term Length  -0.590** (0.204)    0.040** (0.012) 
Staff   0.131**  (0.043)  -0.001#  (0.0005) 
Staff % Population  -1.902 (21.51)  -73.4  (208.7) 
Staff % Population  -1.902 (21.51)  -73.4  (208.7) 
Operating Expenditures   1.909#  (1.000)  -0.0004#  (0.0003) 
Notes: The table reports the results of an ordered probit regression of the following equation: 
MPC = α + β x + γ x
2 + ε, where β is coefficient 1 and γ is coefficient 2. Standard errors are in parentheses. **, 
* and # denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. Evaluation calculates β x + γ x
2 based 
on the estimated coefficients and the mean of the respective variables—excluding those non-significant. -  28  - 
 
 
D.   Nonlinear Specification 
In most cases, the scatter plots collected in Appendix IV suggest that linear models 
capture the correlation between MPC size and its possible determinants reasonably well. 
Still, to allow for possible non-linearities, we also estimate our ordered probit models with 
quadratic terms.  
Table 6 presents the results. Reassuringly, almost all variables for which we find a 
significant non-linear effect on MPC size were also relevant determinants of MPC size in the 
linear specification; that is, they produced significant coefficients in at least one of the 
specifications reported in Tables 1–5. In addition, the target independence score becomes a 
significant determinant of MPC size, thereby reinforcing the bivariate results for other 
indicators of central bank independence. Other variables, in contrast, lose their significance 
in the non-linear model, such as real GDP and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
A second observation is that the majority of variables display, if anything, a concave 
relationship with MPC size.
35 This holds for population, administrative divisions, economic 
security, government effectiveness, rule of law, debt, and the number of central bank staff. 
The estimation results imply that the marginal benefits of increasing MPC size are declining 
in the relevant country characteristic. That is, a given increase in population size, for 
instance, seems to have a smaller impact on MPC size at lower population levels. 
Our results for the term length of board members deviate from these two general 
findings. The term length of board members is significantly associated with MPC size only in 
                                                 
35 Using the ordered probit coefficients can be misleading in this respect, but we find very similar results based 
on the OLS models. Results are not shown.  -  29  - 
 
the non-linear specification. Also, the relationship is convex rather than concave. As 
illustrated in Appendix V, board members tend to have longer legislated terms in both 
relatively large and relatively small MPCs. 
 
E.   Multivariate Results 
Next, we aim to explain cross-country differences in MPC size by combining various 
explanatory variables. The aim of this exercise is twofold. First, we are interested in 
exploring the robustness of our empirical findings, after controlling for the effect of other 
factors on MPC size. Second, we want to explore the empirical fit of our specification (i.e., 
the extent to which we are able to explain the variation in MPC size in our sample). 
Our empirical approach is essentially guided by data availability; it is constrained by 
possible multicollinearity. Specifically, we select from each group of determinants a 
representative variable that has a particularly strong bivariate correlation with central bank 
board size and is available for a large fraction of the sample. To this baseline specification, 
we then add other variables of intrinsic interest. 
Table 7 reports the results. The first column reports the benchmark specification 
which jointly includes a measure of country size (population), level of economic and 
financial development (real per capita income), openness (landlockedness), political regime 
(voice and accountability), and central bank size (staff; we obtain similar results for operating 
expenditures) to explain the size of the board. As shown, the results indicate that country 
size, a democratic political regime, and a large number of central bank staff are associated 
with larger MPCs, while landlocked and/or richer countries tend to have smaller boards. 
More notably, compared with the bivariate results, all variables (except for landlockedness)  -  30  - 
 
Table 7. Empirical Determinants of MPC Size 
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Number 
Observations 
83 83 78 53 83 64 53 50 
Count R2  0.542 0.530 0.551 0.604 0.530 0.563 0.604 0.580 
Pseudo-R2  0.334 0.568 0.368 0.492 0.356 0.477 0.469 0.431 
Notes: Ordered probit regression. Dependent variable is board size index. Pseudo-R
2 is the McKelvey and 
Zavoina R
2. Standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
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 remain economically relevant and statistically highly significant. Finally, it should also be 
noted that our estimation results are derived from a still large sample of 83 observations. 
While the significance levels of individual variables later vary with the set of regressors (and 
sample size), the benchmark estimates generally turn out to be reasonably robust. 
Adding other control variables yields further insights. In column two, we experiment 
with an alternative control for country size, replacing population with land area. This 
modification has little effect on the overall estimation results, though the empirical fit 
appears to be somewhat stronger for some R
2-measures. In the remaining columns, we report 
results for other variables of theoretical interest. Among those variables, the strongest results 
are found for central bank independence and ethnolinguistic fractionalization; the estimated 
coefficients on these variables take on the expected sign and are statistically highly 
significant. Also the exchange rate regime and the degree to which there are limits to central 
bank financing of government debt appear to play (at least marginally) a significant role in 
explaining MPC size in a multivariate framework.
36 In all cases, the results in Table 7 
confirm the (previously reported) direction of the bivariate relationship. Openness and the 
correlation of the national with the world business cycle, in contrast, remain unrelated to 
MPC size. 
Statistically, the overall fit of the multivariate models is encouraging. Pseudo-R
2 
values (as measured by the McKelvey and Zavoina method) are between 0.3 and 0.6. An 
alternative measure, the Count R
2, is generally even higher (in the 0.5 to 0.6 range), 
                                                 
36 Government debt, which played a role in the bivariate setup, does not show a significant influence on MPC 
size in the multivariate model.  -  32  - 
 




IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
Recent research emphasizes the importance of central bank design for the success of 
monetary policy. One of the features that have received particular interest is the membership 
size of the central bank’s decision-making body—that is, how many people should decide 
whether to take measures to achieve a specified monetary policy target? 
In theory, the optimal size of an MPC depends on the costs and benefits of changing 
membership size. On the benefit side, larger MPCs promise improvements in information 
processing along the lines of Condorcet’s jury theorem. At the same time, decision making 
typically becomes more difficult and time consuming as the number of MPC members 
increases. Also, members may have a stronger incentive to “freeride” on the information-
processing efforts of others in larger MPCs. Since factors affecting optimal board size are 
likely to differ across countries (e.g., the information-processing requirement might vary with 
the size and diversity of the economy), it seems reasonable to assume also that “the efficient 
size of a policy committee might vary across countries” (Goodfriend 2005, p. 85). 
Around the world, central bank boards do indeed come in different sizes. In New 
Zealand, for instance, the governor alone is responsible for policy-making, while the 
European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council currently comprises 19 members. 
Moreover, the pending increase in euro area membership has triggered a preemptive ECB 
                                                 
37 As a robustness check, we also performed (unreported) OLS regressions. While the coefficient estimates 
(continued…)  -  33  - 
 
reform that generally limits the overall number of voting members to 21. This, however, still 
seems to be a relatively large number compared with the membership size of other central 
bank decision-making bodies such as the U.S. Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market 
Committee. The average MPC in our sample of central banks has 7–9 members. 
In this paper, we characterize differences in the structure of central bank governance. 
Our analysis is based on a dataset that covers the (de jure) membership size of 84 central 
bank boards around the world at the end of 2003 that make decisions on whether to increase 
or decrease interest rates to achieve a specified target.
38 We find that board size is indeed 
significantly and plausibly correlated to various country and central bank characteristics. For 
instance, MPC size tends to increase with country size and population heterogeneity, thereby 
providing empirical support for the notion that information-processing requirements affect 
central bank board size. There is also evidence that MPC size is correlated to political 
institutions, with more democratic countries having, on average, larger boards. For some 
variables, we find a hump-shaped effect on MPC size. 
Finally, although the size of the central bank’s policy committee has been the focus of 
much debate recently, there are indications that it should not be viewed as independent of 
other features of central bank design. MPC size is often associated with other central bank 
characteristics. For instance, central banks tend to have larger MPCs if they have more staff 
or higher operational expenditure. More importantly, countries with floating exchange rate 
regimes, which typically have more complicated monetary policy frameworks, also seem to 
operate larger boards. Along similar lines, we find that more independent central banks often 
                                                                                                                                                       
were qualitatively unchanged, the adjusted R
2 values were typically on the upper end of that range.  -  34  - 
 
have larger MPCs. Viewed in conjunction with the results discussed previously, this suggests 
that the institutional setup of central banks may indeed be tailored to reflect country-specific 
factors. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
38 In a companion paper, Berger and Nitsch (2007), we examine the effect of various features of MPC design 
on the outcome of monetary policy.  -  35  - 
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APPENDIX I. COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE 
 Angola  Namibia 
 Argentina  Nepal 
 Armenia  Nicaragua 
 Australia  Nigeria 
 Bahamas,  The  Norway 
 Bahrain  Oman 
 Barbados  Pakistan 
 Bolivia  Paraguay 
 Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  Peru 
 Botswana  Philippines 
 Brazil  Poland 
 Bulgaria  Qatar 
 Cambodia  Romania 
 Canada  Russian  Federation 
 Cape  Verde  Rwanda 
 Chile  Serbia  and  Montenegro 
 Colombia  Sierra  Leone 
 Croatia  Singapore 
 Cyprus  Slovenia 
 Czech  Republic  South  Africa 
 El  Salvador  Sudan 
 Estonia  Sweden 
 Fiji  Switzerland 
 Georgia  Tajikistan 
 Guatemala  Tanzania 
 Honduras  Trinidad  and  Tobago 
 Hungary  Tunisia 
 Iceland  Turkey 
 Jamaica  Turkmenistan 
 Japan  Ukraine 
 Jordan  United  Arab  Emirates 
 Kazakhstan  United  Kingdom 
 Kenya  United  States 
 Korea,  Rep.  of  Uzbekistan 
  Kuwait  Venezuela, República Bolivariana de 
  Kyrgyz Republic  Yemen, Rep. of 
 Lao  PDR  Zambia 
 Latvia   
 Lesotho   
 Liberia   
 Lithuania   
  Macedonia, FYR of   
 Madagascar   
 Malawi   
 Malaysia   
 Moldova   
 Mozambique    -  40  - 
 
II. DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF VARIABLES 
 
Variable Description  Source 
MPC  Board size index; implementation board  Lybek and 
Morris 
Population  Total population  Rose 
Area  Land area  Rose 
Real GDP (USD)  Real GDP in US dollar  Rose 
Real GDP (PPP)  Real GDP in PPP terms  Rose 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization, Mauro  Rose 





Ethnic Fractionalization, Alesina et al.  Rose 
Linguistic Diversity  Linguistic Diversity, Ethnologue  Rose 
Linguistic Fractionalization  Linguistic Fractionalization, Alesina et al.  Rose 
Religious Fractionalization  Religious Fractionalization, Collier & 
Hoeffler 
Rose 
Gini Coefficient  Gini Coefficient, CIA World Factbook  Rose 
Geographic Dispersion  Geographic Dispersion, Collier & 
Hoeffler 
Rose 




Real GDP per capita (USD)  Real GDP per capita in US dollar, WDI  Rose 
Real GDP per capita (PPP)  Real GDP per capita in PPP terms, WDI  Rose 
Human Development Index  Human development index, UNDP  Rose 
Urbanization  Urban population/Total population, WDI  Rose 
M3  M3/GDP, WDI  Rose 
Domestic Bank Credit  Domestic bank credit/GDP, WDI  Rose 
Trade Openness  (Exports+Imports)/GDP, WDI  Rose 
Landlocked  Dummy =1 if country is landlocked  Rose 
Business Cycle Correlation  Correlation with world GDP, 20-year 
average 
IFS 
Democracy  Democracy index, Polity IV (10 = 
democratic) 
Rose 
Autocracy  Autocracy index, Polity IV (10 = 
autocratic) 
Rose 
Polity  Polity index, Polity IV (-10 = autocratic; 
10 = democratic) 
Rose 
Political Rights  Political rights index, Freedom House  Rose 
Civil Rights  Civil rights index, Freedom House  Rose 
Economic Freedom  Freedom status, Freedom House  Rose 
Economic Security  Economic security index, ILO  Rose 
Voice & Accountability  Voice & Accountability, World Bank  Rose 
Political Stability  Political Stability, World Bank  Rose 
Government Effectiveness  Government Effectiveness, World Bank  Rose 
Regulatory Quality  Regulatory Quality, World Bank  Rose 
Rule of Law  Rule of Law, World Bank  Rose  -  41  - 
 
Deficit  Overall budget balance/GDP, 10-year 
average 
WDI 
Debt  Central government debt/GDP, 20-year 
average 
WDI 
Central Bank Independence  Summary index (goal = 1; target = 2; 
instrument = 3; other = 4) 
Lybek and 
Morris 
CB Independence Score  Independence score (0 = low; 100 = high)  Fry et al. (BoE) 
Goal Independence  Dummy = 1 if CB has goal independence  Lybek and 
Morris 
Price Stability Focus  Statutory/legal objectives focus on price 
stability? (0 = weak; 1 = strong) 
Fry et al. (BoE) 




Target Independence Score  Independence score (0 = low; 1 = high)  Fry et al. (BoE) 




Instrument Independence Score  Independence score (0 = low; 1 = high)  Fry et al. (BoE) 
Limited or No Autonomy  Dummy = 1 if CB has goal independence  Lybek and 
Morris 
Limited Central Bank Financing 
of Government Deficit 
Independence score (0 = low; 1 = high)  Fry et al. (BoE) 
Authority over Exchange Rate 
Policy 
Dummy = 1 if CB has authority over 
exchange rate policy 
Lybek and 
Morris 
Goal Independence or Exchange 
Rate Policy Authority 
Dummy = 1 if CB has either goal 




Fixed Exchange Rate, RR  Dummy = 1 if fixed exchange rate regime  Reinhart and 
Rogoff 




Fixed Exchange Rate, LYS  Dummy = 1 if fixed exchange rate regime  Levy-Y. & 
Sturzenegger 




Fixed Exchange Rate, IMF  Dummy = 1 if fixed exchange rate regime  IMF 
Floating Exchange Rate, IMF  Dummy = 1 if floating exchange rate 
regime 
IMF 
Term Length  Term length of board members (de jure)  Lybek and 
Morris 
Term Length in CB Law  Dummy = 1 if term length stipulated in 
central bank law 
Lybek and 
Morris 
Staff  Staff number  Central Bank 
Directory 
Staff % Population  Staff/Population Central  Bank 
Directory & Rose 
Operating Expenditures  Operating expenditures  Ize 
Establishment Year  Establishment year  Central Bank 
Directory  -  42  - 
 
III. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
MPC  84 2.85  0.87  1  5 
Population  98 37.44  132.02  0.27  1262.65 
Area  98  0.997 2.588 0.0004  17.075 
Real GDP (USD)  95  0.313 1.194 0.0004  10.300 
Real GDP (PPP)  93  0.430 1.308 0.002 10.300 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  62  0.38 0.29 0.00 0.93 
Ethnic Fractionalization, CH  77  36.92 27.70 0.00  93.00 
Ethnic Fractionalization, ADEKW  47  0.42 0.25 0.01 0.86 
Linguistic Diversity  98 0.43  0.29  0.003  0.99 
Linguistic Fractionalization  94 0.37  0.27  0.002  0.90 
Religious Fractionalization  97 0.46  0.23  0.002  0.86 
Gini Coefficient  74  40.00 10.83 24.40 70.00 
Geographic Dispersion  72  0.63 0.18 0.19 0.97 
Administrative Divisions  97  22.65 29.35 0  195 
Real GDP per capita (USD)  94 10.02  9.53  0.46  35.13 
Real GDP per capita (PPP)  97  7.48 10.09  0.13 39.32 
Human Development Index  74 0.74  0.17  .34  0.95 
Urbanization  98  59.10 22.60 6.15  100.00 
M3  85  48.80 38.26 8.17  193.41 
Domestic Bank Credit  94  65.14 57.20 3.83  317.22 
Trade Openness  91  83.14 38.08 20.18 228.88 
Landlocked  98 0.21  0.41  0  1 
Business Cycle Correlation  97 0.18  0.31  -0.49  0.80 
Democracy  90 6.03  3.78  0  10 
Autocracy  90 1.68  2.83  0  10 
Polity  90 4.36  6.36  -10  10 
Political Rights  98 3.18  2.09  1  7 
Civil Rights  98 3.36  1.69  1  7 
Economic Freedom  76  6.65 0.96 4.66 8.56 
Economic Security  58  0.52 0.23 0.05 0.98 
Voice & Accountability  98 0.14  0.92  -1.75  1.64 
Political Stability  96 0.17  0.98  -2.38  1.73 
Government Effectiveness  97 0.23  1.04  -1.58  2.48 
Regulatory Quality  98 0.25  0.91  -2.14  2.27 
Rule of Law  98 0.25  1.07  -1.52  2.22 
Deficit  82 -2.90  3.34  -13.65  10.85 
Debt  76  49.23 35.76 0  189.53 
Central Bank Independence  98 2.67  0.83  1  4 
CB Independence Score  93 73.5  16.2  24 98 
Goal Independence  98 0.16  0.37  0  1 
Price Stability Focus  93 0.76  0.20  0  1 
Target Independence  98 0.42  0.50  0  1 
Target Independence Score  93 0.58  0.31  0  1 
Instrument Independence  98 0.35  0.48  0  1 
Instrument Independence Score  93 0.82  0.29  0  1  -  43  - 
 
Limited or No Autonomy  98 0.07  0.26  0  1 
Limited Central Bank Financing of 
Government Deficit 
93 0.76  0.27  0  1 
Authority over Exchange Rate Policy  98 0.09  0.29  0  1 
Goal Indep. or Exch. Rate Policy Auth.  98 0.33  0.47  0  1 
Fixed Exchange Rate, RR  98 0.22  0.42  0  1 
Floating Exchange Rate, RR  98 0.06  0.24  0  1 
Fixed Exchange Rate, LYS  98 0.45  0.50  0  1 
Floating Exchange Rate, LYS  98 0.30  0.46  0  1 
Fixed Exchange Rate, IMF  98 0.37  0.48  0  1 
Floating Exchange Rate, IMF  98 0.53  0.50  0  1 
Term Length  70 5.19  1.97  3  14 
Term Length in CB Law  98 0.84  0.37  0  1 
Staff  89  4.04 18.03  0.10 150.00 
Staff % Population  89 0.01  0.01  0.002  0.09 
Operating Expenditures  99  0.243 0.567 0.004 3.626 
Establishment Year  98  1939 59.33  1668 1997  -  44  - 
 
IV. SCATTER PLOTS 
Panel A1: Size 
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Panel D (concluded): Central Bank Characteristics 
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